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Subtitles by explosiveskull
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We are going through
the most profound change
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in communication technologies in
all of human history right now.
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Printing press, radio, telegraph,
television. All very important.
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But I believe we're going
through the most transformative,
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purely on the basis
of three technologies.
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Mobile, social media
and cloud computing.
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They share one
very important characteristic.
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And that's the amount
of private information.
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Information that used to be in
our desktops or filing cabinets,
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even in our heads,
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that we now
entrust to third parties.
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Data that we are conscious of,
and deliberate about,
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like the e-mails we send
and the tweets we post.
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But it also includes
a lot of information
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that we're completely,
or mostly, unconscious about.
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So if you take my mobile phone,
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even when I'm not using it,
it's emitting a pulse,
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trying to locate the nearest Wi-Fi
router or cell phone exchange,
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and within that beacon is
the make and model of the phone,
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the fact that it's my phone,
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because my name is attached
to the operating system,
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and most importantly,
the geolocation of the phone.
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We are
leaving this digital exhaust
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that contains extraordinarily precise
information about our lives,
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our social relationships reduced
to trillions of data points
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that form now this new ethereal
layer around the planet
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that's only growing
in all directions.
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Capabilities are being put
in the hands of policy makers,
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five years ago, they'd never
imagine that they would have.
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This is where big data
meets Big Brother.
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Should be here.
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It is kind
of in a rock, I think.
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Yeah, the entrance is in a rock.
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Or a bunker.
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Oh, yeah, the bunker.
It is down there!
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There is a
bunker under here.
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- Yeah.
- It is between 33 and 39.
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Right there.
Look at that door.
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- Yeah.
- Yeah, this is it.
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- Bahnhof.
- Okay.
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Hey, I guess we just go in.
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Many people believe that you have this
cloud services that are floating around.
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People think, "Okay,
it's a cloud server."
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But this is the actual physical
location of the Internet.
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It's a
constant struggle to protect data.
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The Swedish Security Police
wanted to install tools
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to automatically log in to our
data and get out the information.
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So I invited them
to our facility,
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and then I had a microphone
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which I was provided by the Swedish
Public Service, national radio.
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I taped this conversation,
and they were so angry.
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And they also wanted us
to sign a paper
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where they said that we could
not say anything about it.
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It should be total secrecy.
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They said, "If a terrorist attack
happens, it's your fault."
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It's, like, a creepy feeling.
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Nobody can say that
any facility is safe.
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There are always possibilities to go
in and find data and take it out.
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People say that, "Oh, I don't
have anything to hide.
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They can read my mail.
I don't have anything."
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But it's not that
which is this problem.
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The problem is, without secrecy,
there can be no democracy.
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Without secrecy,
there can be no market economy.
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Right.
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There is an obvious candidate
for the Nobel Peace Prize.
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- Really?
- And that is Edward Snowden.
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I mean, yeah.
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Does the public enjoy the same right
to privacy that we have in the past?
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Are we still private citizens,
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and then public officials, where the
government knows very little about us,
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but we know
everything about them?
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Why are we, the public,
becoming disempowered
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at the same time that
governments around the world,
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corporations around the world,
institutions around the world,
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are gaining greater and greater leverage
over the range of our activities,
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their knowledge of what we do?
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The Citizen Lab
is an unusual place.
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We're a research unit
at the University of Toronto.
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We combine the skills of
engineers, computer scientists
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with social scientists.
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We collaborate with people
from all over the world
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to do the field research
that we do.
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And we do this to advance
research on global security,
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cyberspace
and human rights.
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The world is
a very dangerous place
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as we saw recently in... in
tragic incidents in Paris,
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and you want to have security
agencies be well adept at discerning
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what those threats
are over our horizon.
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But is it okay that the government
sets up a giant digital X-ray machine
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over everything that we do?
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Because that's effectively
where we're headed right now.
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We've been a kind of
digital early warning system,
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scanning the horizon.
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And what we've seen, frankly,
has been really disturbing.
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Tibetans are watched
from every angle and from every corner.
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It's in their homes, it's in their
offices, it's in the streets.
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In Tibet,
certainly in central Tibet
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and around
the capital city of Lhasa,
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Chinese authorities, together
with Chinese corporations,
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telecommunications companies,
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they've integrated the ability to spy
on people via their mobile phone,
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via the last communications they
may have had over the Internet.
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Down to the closed circuit
television camera on the streets.
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The Chinese so strictly
control access to Tibet,
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it's just like a black hole
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for media,
for independent observers,
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for international agencies,
for anything.
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How I escaped is a secret.
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People are
incredibly courageous.
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People inside Tibet will
send out news and information.
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And they'll say,
"I want this story to be told."
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They could be imprisoned.
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They could be tortured.
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Their family
could pay the price.
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We on the outside have to decide
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how to walk this very, sort of, fine line
between protecting people's security
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and honoring their wishes about
getting news and information out.
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And we know for a fact,
thanks to Citizen Lab's report,
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that we are being
successfully targeted.
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A new report has been released from
a group of digital detectives.
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From their computers in Toronto,
they've tracked a high-tech spy ring
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that reaches around the world.
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For the past ten months,
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these computer experts have
been working as cyber sleuths
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hot on the trail of a massive
electronic spy network.
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They say it has taken control of
nearly 1,300 high-level computers
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in more than 100 countries.
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A discovery that could have
major political implications.
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They can extract any
document they wanted.
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They could turn on web cameras,
turn on audio devices,
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so that they could,
in effect, use the computers
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as a listening device
in the offices.
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The web of intrigue
started with the Dalai Lama
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who thought his computer
had been hacked.
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Up until about 2007 or 2008, I'd
never really heard of malware.
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You know, I'd heard
of viruses, obviously,
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but I hadn't really heard
about targeted malware attacks
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affecting
the human rights community.
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First time I heard about it was
in the context of the Tibetans.
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Gradually we started piecing together,
they are under surveillance.
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The surveillance comes
from groups within China.
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They're using malicious software
and socially-engineered e-mails.
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E-mails that are crafted
to get them to open it up
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to get inside their devices.
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Nart Villeneuve, a computer wiz,
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figured out
how the operation worked
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by getting the attackers
to hack into his computer.
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We're monitoring these groups
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for long periods of time,
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and you're essentially waiting
for them to screw up, right?
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And when they do,
you take advantage of that.
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Sometimes it takes a long time.
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You could be monitoring a group
for a year and get nothing.
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Then one day, they just use a
server that they don't lock down
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and all the data's
just sitting there.
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I was at home.
It was pretty late.
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Nart was scouring through it,
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trying to figure out
what actor is responsible
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for getting inside
the Dalai Lama's office.
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And there was a 22 or 24 character
string that kept coming up
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that he couldn't figure out,
"What is the meaning of this?"
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So on a whim, he just copied
and pasted it into Google.
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One website came up,
and it was Chinese characters.
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So he clicked on it.
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To my surprise, what came
back was the actual page
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that the attackers used to interface
with the compromised systems.
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So they set up a website where
they could monitor their victims.
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But they didn't
password protect it!
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So it was like a window
into everything they were doing.
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This wasn't just targeted
at Tibetan organizations
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or human rights organizations.
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This was global, a pretty
wide range of institutions
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that showed that these attackers were...
were quite busy.
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There was huge pickup in the media.
It was all over the world.
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And it put us on a different kind of
footing in terms of our credibility.
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In the cyber security community,
we were novices at that time.
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We were kind of outsiders.
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So we were kind of
calling it on the fly.
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Like, what do we do?
What's the right thing to do?
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Who do we notify?
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I knew that publishing it
was important.
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We had to redact a lot of the
information to protect people.
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Should we notify the government?
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Should we notify
the Canadian government?
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How do we notify other governments
that are being victimized?
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At the time, you know,
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we didn't want to completely disclose
everything that we had done,
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because we
wanted to do it again.
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In some of the communities
I mentioned, they loved it.
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But I got the feeling from,
certainly inside my own government,
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there was a lot of weirdness.
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- Are we allowed to speculate?
- Well, I think now we know
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because there's a Snowden disclosure
that explicitly references the fact
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that the Canadians
and the Americans,
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our signals
intelligence agencies,
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were piggybacking
off the GhostNet network.
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So, in publishing the report, we
basically broke up their party.
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From our initial samples from
the office of the Dalai Lama,
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they were actually compromised
by two distinct groups.
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The GhostNet group obviously
got the most attention.
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But there was another group
that was also active.
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The GhostNet group
shut down their operations,
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but the other group, um,
they're still going.
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In our research,
what we see are acts of war
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that take place
against citizens,
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using these very technologies.
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Getting inside the computers of
Tibetans and then arresting them,
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and possibly executing them,
is a kind of act of war.
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We see this sort
of thing every week, right?
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Minor to major versions of it.
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Everything on the site
is correct except this.
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So this... The last log-in on
the C panel was from Korea.
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- Mm-hmm.
- Do you guys have any work in Korea?
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- Is there any...
- No, no...
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So who actually accesses the website to
update it and all that sort of thing?
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- It must be somebody unauthorized.
- Yeah.
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One, two, three,
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four, five, six,
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seven.
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Hmm.
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Not that long ago, the government
of Pakistan put out this tender
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for proposals for a nationwide
Internet filtering system.
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They wanted to solicit proposals
from companies to build,
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effectively,
the Great Firewall of Pakistan.
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Today if you visit Pakistan
and you get online
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and you try to access YouTube,
this is what you'll see,
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a blocked page like this.
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I'm in Islamabad,
putting in a SIM card.
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First and foremost, I'm really
excited to see Shahzad.
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I first met Shahzad and
the organization Bytes for All,
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eight years ago, I think?
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And he's been involved,
in one way or another,
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in Citizen Lab research
ever since.
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- Hi, Shahzad.
- Hello!
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- So great to see you.
- Here we are. Here we are.
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Bytes for All does what they do,
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fight for Internet rights and
advocacy-based approach to Internet freedom
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under extreme duress.
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So they're operating
in a country that,
241
00:29:01,372 --> 00:29:04,238
specifically around media
and free expression,
242
00:29:04,240 --> 00:29:06,440
has got to be one of
the worst places in the world.
243
00:29:06,442 --> 00:29:10,112
Uh, journalists are
routinely kidnapped, murdered,
244
00:29:10,114 --> 00:29:12,948
uh, offices firebombed,
et cetera,
245
00:29:12,950 --> 00:29:15,120
and they've experienced
all of that.
246
00:29:16,487 --> 00:29:19,888
Death threats,
staff members kidnapped,
247
00:29:19,890 --> 00:29:23,892
his own son beat up and
thrown to the side of the road
248
00:29:23,894 --> 00:29:26,964
as a warning to Shahzad
not to do what he's doing.
249
00:29:31,035 --> 00:29:33,367
In my opinion,
250
00:29:33,369 --> 00:29:37,775
Internet has opened up
so many opportunities...
251
00:29:38,909 --> 00:29:40,508
for the people to express,
252
00:29:40,510 --> 00:29:44,947
and that is the sole reason that
we are fighting for open Internet.
253
00:29:44,949 --> 00:29:48,482
They lost their public spaces.
254
00:29:48,484 --> 00:29:52,321
They lost their ability
to go out freely.
255
00:29:52,323 --> 00:29:56,290
So, as they are putting controls
and curbs on physical spaces,
256
00:29:56,292 --> 00:30:00,295
they are doing exactly the same
in online spaces as well.
257
00:30:00,297 --> 00:30:04,232
So precisely the reason we are standing
out there to reclaim those spaces.
258
00:30:04,234 --> 00:30:05,933
And we have to at some point,
259
00:30:05,935 --> 00:30:07,504
and we'll continue to do that.
260
00:30:08,939 --> 00:30:11,472
Oh, my God.
261
00:30:11,474 --> 00:30:15,110
The government has the ability
to ban specific pages.
262
00:30:17,181 --> 00:30:19,448
You ban all of
Facebook, businesses are suffering,
263
00:30:19,450 --> 00:30:20,548
people communicate.
264
00:30:20,550 --> 00:30:23,384
I mean, you can
laugh and joke and say,
265
00:30:23,386 --> 00:30:26,153
"For a few days people won't play
FarmVille," but it's not about that.
266
00:30:26,155 --> 00:30:29,490
It's about your fundamental
rights being snatched from you
267
00:30:29,492 --> 00:30:33,061
and no government, in my opinion,
should have the ability to do that.
268
00:30:33,063 --> 00:30:34,462
Right.
269
00:30:34,464 --> 00:30:37,599
Not only that, they banned
Wikipedia for a little while.
270
00:30:37,601 --> 00:30:39,167
- Yes, mm-hmm.
- YouTube.
271
00:30:39,169 --> 00:30:42,470
Uh, about several thousand
websites were affected.
272
00:30:42,472 --> 00:30:46,107
I think the Internet is
this vast, unregulated,
273
00:30:46,109 --> 00:30:48,610
wonderful, democratizing space
274
00:30:48,612 --> 00:30:51,380
and no matter what anyone does,
people will find a way.
275
00:31:43,534 --> 00:31:46,701
Hi, I'm Sabeen Mahmud, and I'm
the director of Peace Nation,
276
00:31:46,703 --> 00:31:48,737
a nonprofit organization.
277
00:31:48,739 --> 00:31:51,739
I've always believed that technology
is always the driver of change,
278
00:31:51,741 --> 00:31:55,009
not business, not governments,
but technology.
279
00:31:55,011 --> 00:32:00,082
And gender-based violence
has always existed
280
00:32:00,084 --> 00:32:03,584
but with the advent of the Internet and
the number of social networking tools,
281
00:32:03,586 --> 00:32:06,555
I think it's
a great mobilization platform.
282
00:32:25,709 --> 00:32:28,477
Sabeen Mahmud
was leaving a Karachi restaurant
283
00:32:28,479 --> 00:32:31,212
when the gunman
attacked her in her car.
284
00:32:31,214 --> 00:32:34,382
Her mother who was also
accompanying her was wounded
285
00:32:34,384 --> 00:32:36,551
and now is in a critical
condition.
286
00:32:36,553 --> 00:32:40,055
Mahmud was taken to a hospital
where she was pronounced dead.
287
00:32:56,406 --> 00:33:01,543
When she spoke in physical
spaces, nothing happened.
288
00:33:01,545 --> 00:33:05,313
When she was carrying on her
campaign, she was not targeted.
289
00:33:05,315 --> 00:33:07,382
People were amused or they
ignored her,
290
00:33:07,384 --> 00:33:09,584
or they just walked past.
291
00:33:09,586 --> 00:33:14,088
But when this whole, sort of,
campaign
292
00:33:14,090 --> 00:33:16,357
hit the Internet
and the social media,
293
00:33:16,359 --> 00:33:18,526
that's when
the lynch mobs gathered.
294
00:33:18,528 --> 00:33:21,196
And one of
the reasons I find is,
295
00:33:21,198 --> 00:33:27,235
that speech in a physical space lasts
only as long as you're speaking.
296
00:33:27,237 --> 00:33:33,574
But once it is uploaded onto the Internet
on any platform, it is there forever.
297
00:33:33,576 --> 00:33:38,212
And then your attackers or,
you know, whoever opposes you,
298
00:33:38,214 --> 00:33:40,449
they gather,
and then they spread it further
299
00:33:40,451 --> 00:33:43,785
and more and more
people join that group
300
00:33:43,787 --> 00:33:47,424
of people who are attacking and
it takes on a life of its own.
301
00:34:07,376 --> 00:34:10,244
We're going through
a demographic revolution.
302
00:34:10,246 --> 00:34:15,182
The center of gravity of cyberspace
is shifting right before our eyes.
303
00:34:15,184 --> 00:34:18,552
From the north and the west of the
planet, where it was invented,
304
00:34:18,554 --> 00:34:21,188
to the South and the East.
305
00:34:21,190 --> 00:34:25,360
The vast majority of Internet
users today and into the future
306
00:34:25,362 --> 00:34:27,394
are coming
from the developing world,
307
00:34:27,396 --> 00:34:30,699
for whom these technologies
are empowering.
308
00:34:30,701 --> 00:34:35,737
What should we expect then from
these next billion digital users
309
00:34:35,739 --> 00:34:38,539
as they come online
in the post-Snowden era?
310
00:36:47,704 --> 00:36:50,371
Once we started
with Midia Ninja,
311
00:36:50,373 --> 00:36:54,309
and we went to the streets
and tried to do live streaming.
312
00:36:54,311 --> 00:36:58,012
There was a mobile station
with an electric generator
313
00:36:58,014 --> 00:37:00,481
using gasoline, you know,
314
00:37:00,483 --> 00:37:05,487
a 4G modem, a laptop,
a camera, a video switcher and...
315
00:37:26,576 --> 00:37:29,311
It was good
in the first two or three times
316
00:37:29,313 --> 00:37:31,646
in more calm demonstrations.
317
00:37:31,648 --> 00:37:34,048
I remember there was a discussion,
and then Carioca said,
318
00:37:34,050 --> 00:37:37,786
"No, I found an app.
319
00:37:37,788 --> 00:37:40,688
Its name is TwitCasting
and maybe we can try it."
320
00:37:42,893 --> 00:37:48,565
It was a Japanese free app used by
teenagers to hang out, you know.
321
00:38:19,829 --> 00:38:23,731
Looking at Brazil, this is one
of those cases where you have
322
00:38:23,733 --> 00:38:25,900
a sporting event, in this case,
323
00:38:25,902 --> 00:38:31,005
which triggers all sorts of
extra concern around security
324
00:38:31,007 --> 00:38:34,376
and the control of information,
much of it legitimate.
325
00:38:34,378 --> 00:38:39,046
But what often happens is that
the layering of surveillance,
326
00:38:39,048 --> 00:38:42,450
extra-legal measures that
happens leading up to
327
00:38:42,452 --> 00:38:45,619
and during these events
doesn't just disappear.
328
00:38:45,621 --> 00:38:47,988
It becomes part of
the permanent architecture.
329
00:39:16,119 --> 00:39:19,554
Mobile phones are prevalent.
Everyone has one in their hands.
330
00:39:19,556 --> 00:39:22,724
And the police
now use a technique
331
00:39:22,726 --> 00:39:27,662
where they set up fake cell phone towers
that captures everyone within the vicinity
332
00:39:27,664 --> 00:39:31,800
and gathers up identifying information
that's emitted by the cell phones,
333
00:39:31,802 --> 00:39:33,901
which they then
use to track people
334
00:39:33,903 --> 00:39:36,170
and associate them
with each other
335
00:39:36,172 --> 00:39:39,740
and being at specific
physical events like a protest
336
00:39:39,742 --> 00:39:42,142
and the government
can go back in time
337
00:39:42,144 --> 00:39:47,081
and re-create every facet of your
life on that particular day and hour.
338
00:39:47,083 --> 00:39:49,516
With whom
you were communicating.
339
00:39:49,518 --> 00:39:52,454
Not only what you're broadcasting
but what you're saying privately
340
00:39:52,456 --> 00:39:55,059
and use this to incriminate you
down the road.
341
00:41:18,541 --> 00:41:21,141
People realize there's
some hidden mechanism of power
342
00:41:21,143 --> 00:41:23,778
going on through surveillance.
343
00:41:23,780 --> 00:41:27,615
And you begin to suspect, maybe,
this device you can't trust.
344
00:41:27,617 --> 00:41:30,784
Maybe the state's in here
or it's in my mobile phone or...
345
00:41:30,786 --> 00:41:33,253
And as that kind of
seeps out there,
346
00:41:33,255 --> 00:41:36,891
people become much more
unwilling to take risks.
347
00:41:36,893 --> 00:41:37,992
You know, even in our own work,
348
00:41:37,994 --> 00:41:41,329
we're much more cautious
about what we say over e-mail,
349
00:41:41,331 --> 00:41:43,764
worried that
somebody's listening and so on.
350
00:41:43,766 --> 00:41:47,334
It's like sand in the machinery.
It kind of slows things down
351
00:41:47,336 --> 00:41:50,637
and everything becomes
much more complicated,
352
00:41:50,639 --> 00:41:53,273
just to communicate
basic instructions.
353
00:41:53,275 --> 00:41:55,712
You're like, "Oh,
first I have to encrypt it."
354
00:41:57,313 --> 00:42:00,748
All these technologies too,
cryptography things,
355
00:42:00,750 --> 00:42:02,684
they might be getting cheap,
356
00:42:02,686 --> 00:42:07,822
but if we consider in terms
of time, they are expensive.
357
00:42:07,824 --> 00:42:11,325
You know, people are being
murdered every day in the favelas.
358
00:42:11,327 --> 00:42:14,362
The military police
are still running.
359
00:42:14,364 --> 00:42:17,898
So it's complicated now
to stop the machines
360
00:42:17,900 --> 00:42:21,070
and adapt our system
to a more safe mode.
361
00:46:40,996 --> 00:46:43,898
So at the same time
that you have so many people
362
00:46:43,900 --> 00:46:48,369
able to communicate to
a global audience at an instant,
363
00:46:48,371 --> 00:46:53,074
governments, in ways that
they weren't 20 years ago,
364
00:46:53,076 --> 00:46:58,246
are really ramping up information
controls because they see...
365
00:46:58,248 --> 00:47:01,148
And when we say "governments," we're
really talking about entrenched powers,
366
00:47:01,150 --> 00:47:06,153
institutionalized, uh, you know,
forms of capitalism in the state
367
00:47:06,155 --> 00:47:09,123
that see, you know,
368
00:47:09,125 --> 00:47:13,494
this type of unpredictable citizen
activism as a threat to their interests
369
00:47:13,496 --> 00:47:15,932
and are developing ways
to counter it.
370
00:47:18,300 --> 00:47:20,369
You have new challenges today.
371
00:47:22,204 --> 00:47:25,942
Sensitive data is transmitted
over encrypted channels.
372
00:47:26,976 --> 00:47:29,577
You need more.
373
00:47:29,579 --> 00:47:32,382
You want to look through
your target's eyes.
374
00:47:34,650 --> 00:47:36,619
You have to hack your target.
375
00:47:42,592 --> 00:47:47,030
You have to overcome encryption
and capture relevant data.
376
00:47:48,630 --> 00:47:51,467
Being stealth and untraceable.
377
00:47:54,938 --> 00:47:56,940
Exactly what we do.
378
00:48:02,311 --> 00:48:07,148
The vendors of these products and
services market them to governments,
379
00:48:07,150 --> 00:48:09,083
usually at trade shows
380
00:48:09,085 --> 00:48:13,153
that are only open to accredited law
enforcement and intelligence agencies.
381
00:48:13,155 --> 00:48:16,691
Actually, I've got
a big binder that I can...
382
00:48:16,693 --> 00:48:19,526
So, if you ignore the bag,
actually which...
383
00:48:21,063 --> 00:48:25,231
someone, uh, deposited
these in as a gift to me,
384
00:48:25,233 --> 00:48:29,202
but I think was hoping to disguise
it in the kindergarten bag.
385
00:48:29,204 --> 00:48:35,108
These are brochures from the type of
trade shows that we're talking about,
386
00:48:35,110 --> 00:48:39,280
products and services that allow
cell phone detection,
387
00:48:39,282 --> 00:48:41,550
uh, insertion of malware...
388
00:48:43,753 --> 00:48:47,021
tracking,
social media monitoring.
389
00:48:47,023 --> 00:48:50,023
In many ways, the way to
think about this market
390
00:48:50,025 --> 00:48:53,526
is that it's the commercialization
of cyber crime.
391
00:48:53,528 --> 00:48:57,430
You trick somebody into
installing a software program
392
00:48:57,432 --> 00:48:59,532
that contains malicious code
393
00:48:59,534 --> 00:49:02,168
that exploits some vulnerability
in the system,
394
00:49:02,170 --> 00:49:06,206
which then allows the attacker
to do anything they want.
395
00:49:06,208 --> 00:49:09,577
Turn on the webcam,
listen in on the microphone,
396
00:49:09,579 --> 00:49:13,780
record keystrokes, record
the location, the movement.
397
00:49:13,782 --> 00:49:16,383
It operates without
much accountability,
398
00:49:16,385 --> 00:49:20,021
certainly no corporate
social responsibility,
399
00:49:20,023 --> 00:49:23,124
ripe for abuse in a place
like Sudan or Ethiopia.
400
00:49:23,126 --> 00:49:25,525
We've seen in one
case after another,
401
00:49:25,527 --> 00:49:28,628
how this ends up being used
to target civil society.
402
00:49:28,630 --> 00:49:29,632
Aha.
403
00:49:31,300 --> 00:49:32,800
Gamma Group.
404
00:49:32,802 --> 00:49:35,769
Maker of the notorious
FinFisher spyware.
405
00:52:18,668 --> 00:52:23,570
The attacker has to socially
engineer or convince the target
406
00:52:23,572 --> 00:52:28,409
to open a file or to, you know, click
through some security warning,
407
00:52:28,411 --> 00:52:30,811
um, in order to become infected.
408
00:52:30,813 --> 00:52:36,217
We had found a document that had pictures
of Ethiopian opposition leaders in it,
409
00:52:36,219 --> 00:52:38,619
and it looked like it was
targeted and designed to appeal
410
00:52:38,621 --> 00:52:40,920
to members of
the Ethiopian diaspora.
411
00:52:40,922 --> 00:52:43,757
Uh, but in fact,
the file was cleverly disguised
412
00:52:43,759 --> 00:52:46,526
to look like a document that's
actually a computer program,
413
00:52:46,528 --> 00:52:48,262
an executable file.
414
00:52:48,264 --> 00:52:50,496
So when you run this, it will
install software on your computer
415
00:52:50,498 --> 00:52:53,233
even though, you know, they
changed the icon and everything
416
00:52:53,235 --> 00:52:56,369
to make it look like this
is a document or a picture.
417
00:52:56,371 --> 00:52:57,540
This is actually a program.
418
00:53:31,773 --> 00:53:34,941
I was able to look at the memory
of an infected computer.
419
00:53:34,943 --> 00:53:37,878
In other words, what's going on inside
the computer when it's infected.
420
00:53:37,880 --> 00:53:42,316
And I was able to identify several
interesting artifacts in the memory,
421
00:53:42,318 --> 00:53:45,519
including a bunch of strings
that said "FinFisher," "FinSpy,"
422
00:53:45,521 --> 00:53:47,824
very clearly attributing this
to the company.
423
00:54:23,793 --> 00:54:27,728
You don't have to be the NSA to
get inside somebody's computer.
424
00:54:27,730 --> 00:54:31,065
Um, instead you can
exploit their curiosity,
425
00:54:31,067 --> 00:54:34,934
their, um, need to communicate.
426
00:54:34,936 --> 00:54:38,572
And of course, journalists, at
the very heart of what they do,
427
00:54:38,574 --> 00:54:42,543
is engage in communication
with a lot of people
428
00:54:42,545 --> 00:54:45,445
and a lot of people that they
don't know and trust necessarily.
429
00:54:45,447 --> 00:54:48,816
Because they're engaged in outreach and
communicating constantly with sources.
430
00:55:02,398 --> 00:55:06,133
Fifty years ago, nobody would have
known what happened in Syria.
431
00:55:06,135 --> 00:55:10,436
But in 2011, when it started,
everybody had Facebook.
432
00:55:10,438 --> 00:55:15,978
Everybody has e-mails and
everybody has WhatsApp and Viber.
433
00:55:17,413 --> 00:55:19,380
So you just can't stop people
434
00:55:19,382 --> 00:55:22,048
from telling
what is happening to them.
435
00:55:22,050 --> 00:55:25,052
So when they besieged Daraa
at the beginning,
436
00:55:25,054 --> 00:55:29,789
they shut down communication, Internet,
land lines and even electricity.
437
00:55:29,791 --> 00:55:34,026
But they did not know that in the
21st century, people have their ways.
438
00:55:34,028 --> 00:55:37,164
People were charging their mobiles
from their cars or generators,
439
00:55:37,166 --> 00:55:40,767
hand generators,
um, manual generators.
440
00:55:40,769 --> 00:55:44,737
And people were using
satellite connections.
441
00:55:44,739 --> 00:55:49,543
You don't need to use the country, uh,
Internet to be connected to the Internet.
442
00:55:49,545 --> 00:55:50,943
You can use anything.
443
00:55:50,945 --> 00:55:54,981
And they were able to tell
what was happening to them.
444
00:55:54,983 --> 00:56:00,720
Um, so the story got around.
445
00:56:09,063 --> 00:56:12,965
A few years ago many of us
celebrated the Arab Spring
446
00:56:12,967 --> 00:56:16,103
as the paradigm of what
these technologies could do.
447
00:56:16,105 --> 00:56:19,472
Remember we called it at the
time "liberation technologies."
448
00:56:19,474 --> 00:56:21,641
They would bring about the end
of authoritarian rule.
449
00:56:29,518 --> 00:56:35,222
Unfortunately, Syria has become
the Arab Spring's dark aftermath.
450
00:56:42,465 --> 00:56:45,699
As groups
sympathetic to the Assad regime
451
00:56:45,701 --> 00:56:50,003
have employed off-the-shelf malware crime
kits to infiltrate social networks,
452
00:56:50,005 --> 00:56:53,539
arrest, torture and
murder opposition groups
453
00:56:53,541 --> 00:56:55,511
and even target
their air strikes.
454
00:57:24,639 --> 00:57:28,275
From the beginning, we believed that
the camera is the most powerful weapon,
455
00:57:28,277 --> 00:57:30,811
and it was actually
the only weapon we have
456
00:57:30,813 --> 00:57:32,782
to deliver our own message
to the whole world.
457
00:57:40,822 --> 00:57:42,655
This is interesting.
458
00:57:42,657 --> 00:57:44,258
Baraa?
459
00:57:48,931 --> 00:57:53,833
It's a pleasure for me to
introduce one of my best friends,
460
00:57:53,835 --> 00:57:59,273
Mr. Baraa, he's one of the most
activist people inside Syria.
461
00:57:59,275 --> 00:58:02,642
He came a few days ago
'cause he has...
462
00:58:02,644 --> 00:58:07,981
He has... many broken
bones on his body.
463
00:58:10,552 --> 00:58:13,655
He was there and covered
the battle in Daraa City.
464
00:58:17,059 --> 00:58:20,059
And in the afternoon,
they get a tank shell.
465
00:58:22,931 --> 00:58:26,635
He was with his friend,
whom has this camera.
466
00:58:28,036 --> 00:58:30,170
And that good guy, you know,
he gets killed
467
00:58:30,172 --> 00:58:33,706
by one tank shell
from the regime's side.
468
00:58:36,644 --> 00:58:38,244
This video, you will see now,
469
00:58:38,246 --> 00:58:42,751
a remote control car and
it exploded, a huge explosion.
470
00:58:44,286 --> 00:58:45,954
It was filmed
by this camera.
471
00:58:50,726 --> 00:58:51,791
After that,
472
00:58:51,793 --> 00:58:53,994
the rocket launchers
473
00:58:53,996 --> 00:58:55,965
started to hit the place
from the regime's side.
474
00:58:57,199 --> 00:59:01,001
So our activist, this media guy,
475
00:59:01,003 --> 00:59:04,304
he gets killed in here
in this exact... this place.
476
00:59:04,306 --> 00:59:07,139
Now here.
He was standing here.
477
00:59:07,141 --> 00:59:10,010
And people found
the camera with him.
478
00:59:10,012 --> 00:59:12,615
We took out the memory card,
and we post this...
479
00:59:13,815 --> 00:59:16,218
as, you know,
in memory of Hussain.
480
00:59:31,666 --> 00:59:35,769
So now, Mr. Baraa here,
just a few days just to heal.
481
00:59:35,771 --> 00:59:40,173
He paid a visit to some
hospitals to check out himself,
482
00:59:40,175 --> 00:59:44,013
then he will go back into Syria
to keep working.
483
00:59:45,880 --> 00:59:48,648
There is a war on Facebook.
484
00:59:48,650 --> 00:59:53,787
Uh, every side is using Facebook
to promote themselves.
485
01:00:05,668 --> 01:00:08,901
The other way around,
the regime will say,
486
01:00:08,903 --> 01:00:12,838
"We will occupy this area.
We will take over this area."
487
01:00:12,840 --> 01:00:15,941
Then the FSA would leave because
they're afraid of bombardment.
488
01:00:15,943 --> 01:00:16,980
It's just a game.
489
01:00:18,047 --> 01:00:19,248
Facebook is a game.
490
01:00:28,757 --> 01:00:30,092
It was just a silly joke I made.
491
01:00:31,427 --> 01:00:35,195
I didn't hurt anybody.
I didn't insult anyone.
492
01:00:35,197 --> 01:00:39,231
It was not political.
It was not racist.
493
01:00:39,233 --> 01:00:42,168
There is nothing
that they could hold against me
494
01:00:42,170 --> 01:00:44,106
with a thing that
I wrote on Facebook.
495
01:00:46,108 --> 01:00:49,879
But still,
at a time of war...
496
01:00:52,047 --> 01:00:53,115
people get crazy.
497
01:01:01,724 --> 01:01:06,092
They did not drag me
in the street or kidnap me.
498
01:01:06,094 --> 01:01:09,262
They just asked me to come
to ask me a few questions.
499
01:01:09,264 --> 01:01:12,164
This is what they said, so I
signed the paper that I'm coming.
500
01:01:12,166 --> 01:01:18,273
I went the next morning at
11:30, to the detention center.
501
01:01:19,942 --> 01:01:22,008
The security guy came to me.
502
01:01:22,010 --> 01:01:25,445
He's like...
He's like half of my height.
503
01:01:25,447 --> 01:01:27,847
He blindfolded me,
and I was like,
504
01:01:27,849 --> 01:01:31,184
I was okay with that
because I thought, it's some...
505
01:01:31,186 --> 01:01:37,023
it's confidential secrets of the country
that they don't want me to see.
506
01:01:37,025 --> 01:01:41,764
And then I was presented to the
detective or the interrogator.
507
01:01:42,431 --> 01:01:43,432
I never saw him.
508
01:01:46,434 --> 01:01:50,970
He told me, "You're a computer engineer.
Please be seated."
509
01:01:50,972 --> 01:01:55,775
And I sat next to him and he started
reading all my Facebook posts.
510
01:01:55,777 --> 01:01:56,812
I was like, "Oh."
511
01:02:08,489 --> 01:02:10,891
One of the posts
that I wrote was,
512
01:02:10,893 --> 01:02:13,959
"No praying, no fasting
until the regime falls,"
513
01:02:13,961 --> 01:02:15,764
which was actually
making fun of both sides.
514
01:02:16,498 --> 01:02:18,063
And I laughed and he's like,
515
01:02:18,065 --> 01:02:20,869
"I'm not kidding with you.
I'm not joking with you."
516
01:02:24,172 --> 01:02:26,438
He kicked me on my chest
517
01:02:26,440 --> 01:02:31,577
and then he requested
the same short guy,
518
01:02:31,579 --> 01:02:33,512
because he was
there in the room,
519
01:02:33,514 --> 01:02:35,514
to bring something called
the "flying carpet,"
520
01:02:35,516 --> 01:02:37,284
which is a torturing machine.
521
01:02:37,286 --> 01:02:42,054
It's a wooden board,
like the door,
522
01:02:42,056 --> 01:02:45,127
but it has joints in the middle
that can flip.
523
01:02:46,027 --> 01:02:50,162
And I had to lay on it.
524
01:02:50,164 --> 01:02:54,501
They tied my wrists and they tied me
from the middle, they tied my legs.
525
01:02:54,503 --> 01:02:59,305
And they just closed it
so my knees touched my chest.
526
01:02:59,307 --> 01:03:01,608
He took off my shoes
and my socks
527
01:03:01,610 --> 01:03:07,250
and started beating me with a
metal, uh, with a metal whip.
528
01:03:09,885 --> 01:03:13,856
The pain is unbelievable.
529
01:03:14,889 --> 01:03:16,356
You just can't take it anymore.
530
01:03:16,358 --> 01:03:20,363
You just can't endure
this amount of agony.
531
01:03:28,971 --> 01:03:32,304
What we saw in Syria
was a lot of use of, say,
532
01:03:32,306 --> 01:03:34,541
off-the-shelf remote access
tools.
533
01:03:34,543 --> 01:03:38,211
So this is sort of software that you can
get from underground message boards
534
01:03:38,213 --> 01:03:40,579
or maybe purchase
for not so much money.
535
01:03:40,581 --> 01:03:44,617
Maybe $200-300 that
give you the ability
536
01:03:44,619 --> 01:03:47,554
to record someone's keystrokes,
read their e-mails,
537
01:03:47,556 --> 01:03:50,956
even look at them
through their webcam.
538
01:03:50,958 --> 01:03:53,392
Record via
the computer's microphone,
539
01:03:53,394 --> 01:03:56,231
conversations that are being had
around the target's computer.
540
01:03:57,465 --> 01:03:59,999
Frequently what you would see
541
01:04:00,001 --> 01:04:02,668
is it would be bundled
with some type of lured document
542
01:04:02,670 --> 01:04:07,072
which showed
a deep understanding
543
01:04:07,074 --> 01:04:09,943
of the psychology of the people
they were trying to target.
544
01:04:09,945 --> 01:04:14,680
For instance, one of the documents
that was sent out that I keenly recall
545
01:04:14,682 --> 01:04:17,182
was a list.
546
01:04:17,184 --> 01:04:23,188
A purported list of insurgents
identified by the Syrian government.
547
01:04:23,190 --> 01:04:28,193
So of course what happened was that
this was promptly passed around
548
01:04:28,195 --> 01:04:31,298
to all sorts of very
interesting groups in Syria
549
01:04:31,300 --> 01:04:34,300
because everyone wanted to know
if they were on this list or not.
550
01:04:34,302 --> 01:04:40,106
So the actual spyware payload itself
wasn't particularly sophisticated,
551
01:04:40,108 --> 01:04:43,175
but the social...
552
01:04:43,177 --> 01:04:46,479
the social and social engineering
side of that operation,
553
01:04:46,481 --> 01:04:48,551
um, was quite smart.
554
01:04:55,023 --> 01:04:58,494
Internet entered almost
all countries in the region
555
01:04:59,527 --> 01:05:01,029
before it entered Syria.
556
01:05:02,230 --> 01:05:03,229
Yes.
557
01:05:03,231 --> 01:05:05,565
Government in Syria,
558
01:05:05,567 --> 01:05:08,068
we are not as developed
as Canada, for example,
559
01:05:08,070 --> 01:05:10,103
or not as developed
as United States.
560
01:05:10,105 --> 01:05:13,206
In Canada they can monitor
people and control people
561
01:05:13,208 --> 01:05:16,075
and spy people in
a very intelligent way.
562
01:05:16,077 --> 01:05:18,514
And even they don't
feel that they are...
563
01:05:21,382 --> 01:05:22,715
spied on.
564
01:05:22,717 --> 01:05:27,556
But in Syria,
of course you go to old ways.
565
01:05:34,329 --> 01:05:37,229
They untie me and then I was...
566
01:05:37,231 --> 01:05:39,999
and then he asked me to
sit next to him, and he said,
567
01:05:40,001 --> 01:05:41,003
"Let's start talking."
568
01:05:42,704 --> 01:05:46,271
And I told him, "I don't want
to talk to you anymore."
569
01:05:46,273 --> 01:05:52,612
He said, "I want you to admit you work
with the Free Syrian Electronic Army."
570
01:05:52,614 --> 01:05:55,248
I was like,
"I don't know what that is."
571
01:05:55,250 --> 01:05:58,554
He said, "You like their page. You
like their page on Facebook."
572
01:06:00,021 --> 01:06:02,021
I told him,
"I like their page on Facebook,
573
01:06:02,023 --> 01:06:05,124
but there are too many pages
on Facebook that you can like.
574
01:06:05,126 --> 01:06:07,563
I also like Assad's page
on Facebook."
575
01:06:09,231 --> 01:06:11,664
Well, that did not convince him.
576
01:06:11,666 --> 01:06:16,802
So his boss came and he told
him, "What is going on?"
577
01:06:16,804 --> 01:06:21,307
He told him, "This is the Facebook
guy, and he's not cooperating."
578
01:06:21,309 --> 01:06:25,612
So then his boss told him to,
"Send him down to the basement,
579
01:06:25,614 --> 01:06:29,615
peel his skin off and just
remind me of him after a month."
580
01:06:29,617 --> 01:06:32,284
And I was like, "Can we go
back to the flying carpet?"
581
01:06:35,623 --> 01:06:37,523
I stayed there
for almost a month,
582
01:06:37,525 --> 01:06:41,096
and then I was released
with a presidential amnesty.
583
01:06:43,197 --> 01:06:46,099
So I went in a taxi,
584
01:06:46,101 --> 01:06:50,235
covered with dust,
dirt, shit and blood,
585
01:06:50,237 --> 01:06:53,639
all over my face,
my clothes.
586
01:06:53,641 --> 01:06:57,776
And then the taxi driver felt pity
for me, and he gave me a cigarette.
587
01:06:57,778 --> 01:07:00,048
I remember
that was the first time I cried.
588
01:07:03,184 --> 01:07:07,287
And I went to my flat in Latakia
where I used to study,
589
01:07:07,289 --> 01:07:09,158
and my roommates were
shocked to see me alive.
590
01:07:10,791 --> 01:07:14,764
And then, like, two weeks after
that I fled the country.
591
01:07:16,197 --> 01:07:17,697
I came to Jordan.
592
01:07:17,699 --> 01:07:18,768
I am a journalist now.
593
01:07:32,246 --> 01:07:35,782
With Syria, a lot of the
bad things that are happening
594
01:07:35,784 --> 01:07:39,151
are happening to people who
don't look like Westerners.
595
01:07:39,153 --> 01:07:42,722
The bad things happening to
these people through technology,
596
01:07:42,724 --> 01:07:46,191
through the risks
inherent in technology,
597
01:07:46,193 --> 01:07:49,295
are not different than the kinds
of risks that we may face,
598
01:07:49,297 --> 01:07:51,530
um, although they look
different.
599
01:07:51,532 --> 01:07:52,831
We see in the news
almost every day,
600
01:07:52,833 --> 01:07:56,568
a report of a breach,
some kind of a large hack.
601
01:07:56,570 --> 01:07:58,905
Data being exploited somewhere.
602
01:07:58,907 --> 01:08:01,773
It's the same problem, but in
Syria, it looks very different
603
01:08:01,775 --> 01:08:04,510
and because there are
dark-skinned people,
604
01:08:04,512 --> 01:08:07,246
uh, and there are guns
and a foreign language,
605
01:08:07,248 --> 01:08:10,249
it feels, I think to many,
exotic and different,
606
01:08:10,251 --> 01:08:11,717
and it couldn't happen here.
607
01:08:11,719 --> 01:08:14,354
And I think, in fact,
what you're seeing in Syria
608
01:08:14,356 --> 01:08:17,357
is this is what happens
when the risks get higher
609
01:08:17,359 --> 01:08:18,828
but the technology is the same.
610
01:08:20,328 --> 01:08:21,664
They're using the same Facebook
that we are.
611
01:11:08,529 --> 01:11:11,397
What is this? This is surreal.
612
01:12:51,666 --> 01:12:54,470
Lots of people were there,
by 7:00 in the night,
613
01:12:55,436 --> 01:12:57,803
and we were live.
614
01:13:02,644 --> 01:13:06,845
Suddenly a man came to Carioca,
and he asked to interview him.
615
01:13:10,717 --> 01:13:14,986
And then the military police
came to Carioca, searched his bag.
616
01:13:14,988 --> 01:13:19,558
And then they said
he should be taken to jail
617
01:13:19,560 --> 01:13:23,862
as a preventive arrestment,
to be searched and inquired.
618
01:13:29,470 --> 01:13:33,973
How this information was being
virilized was really amazing.
619
01:13:33,975 --> 01:13:36,608
Like sharing, sharing, sharing,
tweets, tweets, tweets,
620
01:13:36,610 --> 01:13:37,943
mention, mention, mention.
621
01:13:37,945 --> 01:13:39,711
"The Ninja is being arrested."
622
01:13:39,713 --> 01:13:42,113
And suddenly there was,
like, a small crowd.
623
01:13:42,115 --> 01:13:44,483
Like 5,000 people.
624
01:13:44,485 --> 01:13:47,219
And all of them was
screaming together,
625
01:15:18,246 --> 01:15:21,580
Then we posted this
video from the mobile, like, real time,
626
01:15:21,582 --> 01:15:23,251
and it virilized very fast.
627
01:18:16,356 --> 01:18:19,825
The video was just getting
bigger in the social media.
628
01:18:19,827 --> 01:18:21,794
Bruno Teles became a character.
629
01:18:50,858 --> 01:18:53,224
They said
that Bruno was innocent,
630
01:18:53,226 --> 01:18:57,929
and they used Midia Ninja image.
631
01:18:57,931 --> 01:19:00,199
And they credited Midia Ninja.
632
01:19:00,201 --> 01:19:03,501
It was the first time
that we were seeing
633
01:19:03,503 --> 01:19:08,107
Globo recognizing
a free media collective
634
01:19:08,109 --> 01:19:12,544
as a legitimate player
in the communication game.
635
01:19:12,546 --> 01:19:15,317
It was a next step.
636
01:19:46,314 --> 01:19:51,887
Oh, he's changing his shirt.
637
01:22:05,152 --> 01:22:10,188
Ninja! Ninja! Ninja!
638
01:22:29,275 --> 01:22:30,211
Ninja!
639
01:22:59,273 --> 01:23:02,775
I've always been a fan of the
terms "hacking" and "hacktivism."
640
01:23:02,777 --> 01:23:04,410
Especially "hacktivism"
641
01:23:04,412 --> 01:23:07,812
which is the combination of
hacking and political activism.
642
01:23:07,814 --> 01:23:12,651
And those combined
are pretty powerful to me.
643
01:23:12,653 --> 01:23:17,425
It's about encouraging people not
to accept technology at face value.
644
01:23:18,792 --> 01:23:20,659
We need to encourage people
to think about
645
01:23:20,661 --> 01:23:23,594
what it is that surrounds them,
646
01:23:23,596 --> 01:23:26,065
to question authority
647
01:23:26,067 --> 01:23:30,235
in a sense of the authority being the
technological environment around them
648
01:23:30,237 --> 01:23:35,607
and to realize that when you start
pulling back the layers of all of this,
649
01:23:35,609 --> 01:23:37,809
that's where
the exercise of power is.
650
01:23:37,811 --> 01:23:41,280
So if we want liberal democracy
to flourish,
651
01:23:41,282 --> 01:23:44,282
we need people
to start lifting back the layers
652
01:23:44,284 --> 01:23:45,653
and understanding
what's going on.
653
01:24:01,301 --> 01:24:05,303
I think ultimately it comes down
to understanding what your values are,
654
01:24:05,305 --> 01:24:07,772
because how do you
develop your thoughts, right?
655
01:24:07,774 --> 01:24:09,842
How do you determine what it
is that you truly believe?
656
01:24:09,844 --> 01:24:13,411
How do you determine what
it is you really want to say,
657
01:24:13,413 --> 01:24:15,513
if you can't even
keep notes safely?
658
01:24:15,515 --> 01:24:19,585
If you can't have some private
space, some space for thought,
659
01:24:19,587 --> 01:24:22,454
some space to enjoy the product
of your own intellect,
660
01:24:22,456 --> 01:24:24,857
to share that with people
close to you who you trust.
661
01:24:24,859 --> 01:24:27,695
Whether they're family, whether they're
colleagues, whether they're compatriots.
662
01:24:36,670 --> 01:24:42,241
One thing that I see a lot is,
this idea of technology as a solution.
663
01:24:42,243 --> 01:24:44,776
It's a natural thing. Okay,
technology is under threat.
664
01:24:44,778 --> 01:24:46,713
Let's find
a technological solution.
665
01:24:48,282 --> 01:24:49,882
There are so many projects now
666
01:24:49,884 --> 01:24:53,818
around secure communications,
platforms, chats, instant messaging.
667
01:24:53,820 --> 01:24:57,923
But it's only one component
of a solution set.
668
01:24:57,925 --> 01:25:02,163
And I think often overlooked are the
legal and political dimensions.
669
01:25:03,296 --> 01:25:04,428
If we're talking about
670
01:25:04,430 --> 01:25:06,565
protecting and preserving
all of this,
671
01:25:06,567 --> 01:25:10,602
as a secure and open
communication space,
672
01:25:10,604 --> 01:25:12,537
that means holding governments
accountable.
673
01:25:12,539 --> 01:25:14,572
It means holding
companies accountable.
674
01:25:14,574 --> 01:25:17,175
Putting in place rules and laws
675
01:25:17,177 --> 01:25:22,246
that ensures they can't do things that
infringe on our freedoms and rights.
676
01:25:22,248 --> 01:25:25,384
That to me is, uh,
677
01:25:25,386 --> 01:25:29,423
such a critical foundation
of a digital democracy today.
678
01:25:31,118 --> 01:25:36,118
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